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Abstract 
The question this paper poses relates to the role of economic theories in 
gaining wider support around political agendas. That is their ability to 
describe a problem in such a way, so that the “answer” would appear 
not as a political demand in favor of one class, but as a prerequisite for 
the general well being. The main argument is that in the context of 
Keynesian economics, labour cost has been set in the periphery of the 
theory, allowing labour relations to become a subject of social-political 
regulation. By contrast, neoclassical economic theory and its 
successors place the cost of labour at the core of the theory, which in 
turn means that any attempt to regulate labour relations by non-
economic criteria undermines the common wellbeing. Neither the first 
nor the second theoretical setting predetermines or abolishes class and 
political conflicts. But they both produce general attitudes with political 
consequences. 
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In 1944 Karl Polanyi (2001 [1944]: 159) wrote that “class interests offer only a 
limited explanation of long-run movements in society. The fate of classes is more 
frequently determined by the needs of society than the fate of society is determined by 
the needs of classes… the chances of classes in a struggle will depend upon their 
ability to win support from outside their own membership, which again will depend 
upon their fulfillment of tasks set by interests wider than their own”. The question this 
paper poses relates precisely to the role of economic theories in gaining this support. 
That is their ability to describe a problem in such a way, so that the “answer” would 
appear not as a political demand in favor of one class, but as a prerequisite for the 
general well being. To be more precise, in this paper we will try to follow the 
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theoretical shifts that have taken place vis-à-vis the notions of employment and 
unemployment, trying to show that despite the fact that these shifts may be purely 
“theoretical”, they nevertheless produce certain kinds of attitudes or political 
propositions on how to deal with the issue at stake (in our case employment and 
unemployment).  
The main argument is that in the context of Keynesian economics, labour cost have 
been set in the periphery of the theory, allowing labour relations to become a subject 
of social-political regulation. By contrast, neoclassical economic theory and its 
successors (monetarism and the neoclassical synthesis) place the cost of labour at the 
core of the theory, which in turn means that any attempt to regulate labour relations 
by non-economic criteria undermines the common wellbeing. Neither the first nor the 
second theoretical setting predetermines or abolishes class and political conflicts. But 
they both produce general attitudes with political consequences. 
Nevertheless, it is impossible to describe, not to mention to analyze in detail, the main 
economic theories that are mentioned in this paper. In that sense we had to simplify a 
lot, keeping only the main characteristics of each theory. 
 
Labour Demand, Wages and Unemployment in Neoclassical Theory 
A classical economist may sympathize with labor in 
refusing to accept a cut in its money-wage, but he will 
admit that it may not be wise to make it to meet 
conditions which are temporary; but scientific integrity 
forces him to declare that this refusal is, nevertheless, 
at the bottom of the trouble  
John Maynard Keynes (2008 [1936]: 17) 
There are a number of reasons which necessitate a short reference to the neoclassical 
doctrine as regards the labour market.1 Firstly, the Keynesian revolution, in regard to 
employment and unemployment, can be better understood in reference to the previous 
paradigm. The second reason is related to the fact that the vast majority of textbooks 
                                                 
1 It has to be noted, that the neoclassical theory in employment and unemployment was formalized after 
WWII. Until then, there are references  to the workings of a number of economists, but only Pigou and 
Hicks made an attempt to formulate a concrete theory (Dedousopoulos 2004: 213, 228). For an 
excellent review on the neoclassical tradition in Labour Economics see Boyer and Smith 2001.  
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used to train the future economists are reproducing the neoclassical theory.2 The third 
reason stems from the fact that both the monetarist counter-revolution and the 
neoclassical synthesis that replaced Keynesianism, drew directly on this theory by 
reaffirming its main assumptions. 
The fundamental idea behind the neoclassical theory on labour market is that labour is 
a product, just like any other. Consequently, the equilibrium in the labour market will 
be achieved through the supply and demand mechanism. So the question is what 
determines labour supply and demand.  
In regard to the demand for labour, neoclassical theory maintains that it is determined 
by the marginal product of labour. The main assumption is that the “law of 
decreasing returns”3 is valid, which means that, ceteris paribus, after a certain point 
each increases by one unit of input (of production) leads to a proportionally smaller 
increase of the output. The approach of marginal productivity provides us with the 
labour demand curve for each enterprise (it is the descending part of the curve of 
marginal productivity of labour), and the sum of the individual demand curves gives 
us the total labour demand of the economy. Labour demand in the long-run is 
dependent on the technology of production, on the economies of scale, on the 
possibility of swapping labour to capital etc. (those factors form the exact shape of the 
marginal product of labour curve). In the short-run, when the above mentioned factors 
are stable, labour demand depends only on the wage-level: the volume of employment 
a company will use is defined at the point where the wage equals the marginal output 
of labour (diagram 1). Beyond this point, employing one more worker costs more than 
the added value this worker produces.  
As Theocharakis argues, this approach  introduces a strong ethical dimension, as it 
implies that each worker is paid fairly, exactly as much as he/she offers to the actual 
production (Theocharakis 2005: 79). Yet, another point to be made is that all of the 
above mentioned factors are objective and not a product of subjective estimates on 
behalf of each enterprise. We could say that the company is the entity calculating but 
not determining the wage it can pay. It is the all-powerful, abstract economic laws that 
                                                 
2 for example see Samuelson & Nordhaus 1998, Chacholiades 1990, Dornbusch & Fisher 1993 
3 For a detailed historical analysis on the development of the theory of marginal productivity see. 
Schumpeter (1954). 
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define the above, while the company only “announces” the rulings of those laws. All 
rational entrepreneurs must succumb to their effect. 
In regard to labour supply, the theory maintains that each person may choose between 
leisure and work (=income=consumption), while wage is the offset to the discontent 
caused by working. Even though it is not possible to predetermine the exact variation 
of labour supply to a change of wage, the main assumption remains that an increase in 
real wages causes an increase in labour supply and vice versa. It is easy to show that 
this point of view makes a series of “courageous” assumptions,4 namely: no one is 
obliged to work, each person can choose how many hours he/she will work, work per 
se is the opposite of leisure and it doesn’t influence directly the quality of life of 
individuals, not working is synonymous to leisure which by definition is a positive 
value regardless of its extent, it is a wage cut that leads to the reduction of labour 
supply and not the opposite etc. Last, but not least, the main assumption of this point 
of view, is that the only cost faced by someone who wishes to work is the sacrifice of 
their leisure, which amounts to the alternative uses he/she would  make of their time if 
he/she will have chosen not to work (Dedousopoulos 2002: 60). 
One of the most important issues though, is that, unlike labour demand, the labour 
supply does not portray an economic necessity, even though it is subjected to an 
economic rationale (as we seem to be assuming that individuals act rationally aiming 
at maximising their benefit). Neither the position, nor the slope, of the labour supply 
curve is subject to insuperable economic laws because labour supply is defined only 
by subjective criteria (Dedousopoulos 2002: 60) like individual decisions, influenced 
by social circumstances, consumption models and personal traits etc. So, the shift of 
the curve in any direction can be either easier or harder, depending on the dominant 
societal or individual beliefs, but under no circumstances is this shift subject to any 
law except the one regarding work versus leisure. All this suggests that workers can, 
at any time, modify their preferences according to economic circumstances. This 
assumption permutes the weight of adjustment on labour, given the fact that 
entrepreneurs do not possess the same autonomy on determining their demand for 
labour. The point where the demand curve intercepts the supply curve for labour is the 
                                                 
4 For detail criticism on the neo-classical theory of labour supply see Altman (2001), Fleetwood (2006), 
Harrod (1934), Kaufman (2007), Prasch (2000), Sawyer & Spencer (2010), Spencer (2004, 2005), 
Sweezy (1934) 
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equilibrium point that determines simultaneously the real-wage rate and the volume of 
employment in the economy. Schematically, the curve takes the classic Marshallian X 
shape.  
Three conclusions can be drawn from this analysis. Firstly, if supply and demand are 
to function without interference it is impossible for unemployment to arise. Point A1 
determines simultaneously the wage rate and the volume of employment. At the same 
time, this is the point when full employment is reached, meaning that anyone who 
wishes to work at the given wage rate can find a job.5 As Keynes (1936:11) argues, 
within this line of thought there can be only two reasons explaining why 
unemployment is observed: it is either that this unemployment is frictional, which 
means that it is temporary unemployment stemming from a chronic lag of adjustment 
of the supply to the demand or due to temporary distortions of equilibrium,6 or it is 
voluntary unemployment due to the refusal of individuals to work at the given wage 
rate. However, it is not possible to derive anything similar to the notion of involuntary 
unemployment that is the inability to find work regardless of the willingness to work 
at the given wage rate.  
Secondly, persistently high unemployment rates are to be explained only through the 
existence of wage rate higher than the equilibrium wage. For example, in diagram 3, 
if for any reason the wage level is set on W2, labour demand will be L2, labour supply 
will be L3 and this will cause unemployment equal to the distance between L2 and L3. 
In regard to the reasons for which the wage can “stick” at a higher level to that of full 
employment, the answers of the ‘30s are not so much different from the ones of the 
‘70s: strong bargaining position of the Unions, state action establishing minimum 
rates of pay, inability of the collective bargaining mechanism to take full account of 
differences in productivity, public beliefs of what constitutes a reasonable living wage 
etc. All that the above can drag the wage level above the equilibrium point, or can 
block the adjustment of the nominal wage to the level of prices which creates the 
                                                 
5 According to Pigou (1968 [1933]: 3): “a man is only unemployed when he is both not employed and 
also desires to be employed. Moreover, the notion of desiring to be employed must be interpreted in 
relation to established facts as regards (1) hours of work per day, (2) rates of wage and (3) a man’s 
state of health”. This is a definition which stands until today. 
6 For a number of reason that can create those type of temporal distortions see Hicks (1966[1932]: 42-
57) 
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same outcome (Pigou 1968 [1933]:253-255, also Hicks 1966 [1932], Friedman 1976, 
Layard et. al. 1991). 
Thirdly, if employment is to be increased, a wage cut must take place. Such an action 
would have a triple effect. Firstly, unemployment will fall because a part of the labour 
force is going to exit the labour market due to the fact that for some people it “isn’t 
worth working” for a lower wage. Secondly, employment will rise because companies 
will hire workers due to the fall of labour costs.7 Finally, this process will be further 
accelerated through the “Pigou effect”. Schematically, a decrease in wages will be 
followed by a fall of prices. This will signify an increase in demand on behalf of the 
non-wage earners whose earnings were not affected from the wage cut (actually their 
real-earnings will increase through the fall of the prises). The increased demand will 
create more employment.8 The general conclusion is that a decrease in the level of 
wages, ceteris paribus, will lead to an increase in employment and a decrease in 
unemployment irrespective of its nature (Rossier 2002: 608). 
To sum up, according to the neo-classical theory, the real wage rate is determined 
through the demand and supply mechanism. The firm has an optimal level of 
production for every wage rate where profit maximizes. After the wage has been set, 
the firm determines the volume of employment. In case the volume of employment 
has to rise, the only available means is through a wage cut. In theory, the wage rate 
and the volume of employment are determined simultaneously. But given the fact that 
bargaining is about the wages and not about the volume of employment, the wages 
remain a priority. According to the above, the arrow of causality goes from the wages 
to the volume of employment and from there to the final product-output. It looks like 
that: Level of wages → volume of employment → final output. 
 
 
                                                 
7 The fact that the elasticity of employment to the wage is  higher than 1 (Pigou calculated it to be 
between1.5 and 1.7) a wage cut will lead to a proportionally higher increase in employment (Pigou 
1968[1933]:106) 
8 For more on the Pigou effect see. Takami 2010, Rubin 2005 
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Keynes and his General Theory  
“It takes a theory to kill a theory”  
Paul Samuelson (1951: 323) 
The differences between the Keynesian approach and the neo-classical one is not 
limited to the treatment of the objects of analysis, or, to the relations each school 
establishes between those objects. In the Keynesian framework, questions like “what 
does efficiency mean for the economy” or “which is the fundamental unit-of-account 
in economics” are answered quite differently.9 Regarding the issues being discussed 
here, Keynesian analysis marks a significant shift as regards three aspects.  
Firstly, in the foundation of the theory lies the assumption that the success of an 
economic system depends almost solely on whether it accomplishes full-employment 
or not. In this sense, unemployment is not just seen as a negative byproduct, but as the 
main proof of the systems’ malfunction. In the final analysis, Keynesian theory is a 
theory about how to achieve full employment. 
Secondly, in the Keynesian universe, employment is not only the final goal of 
economic policy; it’s also the diachronic unit-of-account of the economic system 
itself. Quantities of money-value and quantities of employment are the only units-of-
account to be found in the General Theory (Keynes 2008 [1936]: 31)  
Thirdly, Keynes showed that the economic system can find itself in equilibrium 
without achieving full employment. To be precise, he argued that there are 
endogenous forces within the system, which lead it to such situations. To prevent this, 
state interventions are demanded. In this sense, Keynes went a step further from just 
arguing on the necessity to regulate the economy, to proving the need of  intervening 
in its workings. 
What determines the total volume of employment in the economy? In contrast to 
neoclassical theory, where the wage level defines the volume of employment, Keynes 
argued that the decisions of the companies are governed by their expectations about 
                                                 
9 For more on the economic philosophy of Keynesianism see Milonakis & Fine (2009: 275-279) and 
Robinson (1964: 71-74)  
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the level of demand for their product.10 In simple words, every entrepreneur is 
forming expectations about the future level of his/hers sales, and then employ as much 
labour as he/she needs to produce this product. The introduction of the time aspect in 
theory (expectations) and the radical uncertainty it created was a revolutionary act 
capable of separating his theoretical system from the neoclassical one (Psalidopoulos 
2001: x, Milonakis & Fine 2009: 272).  
In general, following Keynes (2008 [1936]: 25-26) his theory could be briefly 
described  in the following terms: 
1. In a given situation of technique, resources and costs, income (both money-
income and real income) depends on the volume of employment. 
2. The relationship between the community’s income and what it can be 
expected to spend on consumption will depend in its propensity to consume. 
That is to say, consumption will depend on the level of aggregate income and, 
therefore, on the level of employment, except when there is some change in 
the propensity to consume. 
3. The amount of labor, which entrepreneurs will decide to employ, depends on 
the sum of two quantities, namely the amount which the community is 
expected to spend on consumption, and, the amount which is expected to 
devote to new investment. This sum is called effective demand. 
4. Hence, the volume of employment in equilibrium depends on (i) the aggregate 
supply function, (ii) the propensity to consume, and (iii) the volume of 
investment.  
… 
                                                 
10 He writes: “it follows that in a given situation of technique, recourses and factor cost per unit of 
employment, the amount of employment, both in each individual firm and industry and in the 
aggregate, depends on the amount of the proceeds which the entrepreneurs expect to receive from the 
corresponding output. For entrepreneurs will endeavor to fix the amount of employment at the level 
which they expect to maximize the excess of the proceeds over the factor cost” (Keynes 2008 [1936]: 
22-23). 
Those expectations are of two kinds. There are the short-term expectations concerning mainly the 
price of the product. These expectations define the volume of employment. Namely, the firm will 
employ as  much labor, until the marginal product of labor will equalize not the expected price of the 
product it produces. Secondly, there are the long-term expectations concerning mainly the future profits 
of an investment. Reaching full employment is mainly linked with these kinds of expectations. In 
general, changes in expectations are neither violent nor sudden, but based mainly  on recent experience.  
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8. So, when employment increases, consumption will increase because real 
income has increased. But the increase of consumption will not be as much as 
the increase of real income (due to saving). Here lies the heart of (but also the 
key to) the problem. There should be a quantity to fill the gap between the 
increase of income and consumption. This can be done only by investment 
spending. If the volume of investment is not sufficient in order to fill the gap, 
the economic system may find itself in stable equilibrium with a level of 
employment below full employment. An insufficiency of effective demand 
may bring employment to a standstill before the level of full employment has 
been reached.  In this case we will have involuntary unemployment, meaning 
people who want to work in the given wage level cannot find a job 
Following the above, the key to the problem lies in investment which, in brief, is 
dependent on the interest rate and the rate of capital return. From the inquiry on the 
factors affecting interest rate and capital return rate derives the Keynesian theory on 
interest and money.  
So, in Keynes’ analysis, product, labor and financial markets are interdependent 
systems and the equilibrium in the labor market cannot be defined solely with 
reference to its internal relations (Dedousopoulos 2000: 284). Keynes accepts that the 
real wages are defined by the marginal productivity of labour, but he argues that real 
wages do  not equal money ones (except when full employment has been reached).11 
This permits him to not only to develop his own theory, but also to subordinate the 
neo-classical theory as a mere “special condition” of his own.  
The consequences are grave. Firstly, within Keynes’ analysis, the arrow of causality 
has changed direction, to the one the neoclassical school follows. In his theory, 
aggregate demand defines production, production defines employment, and that 
volume of employment corresponds to a certain wage rate. In the Keynesian universe, 
                                                 
11 Actually, the acceptance by Keynes that real wage equals the marginal disutility of labour, has been 
criticized by his student Joan Robinson who argued that “is a piece of Marshallian luggage that Keynes 
thoughtlessly carried with him (Robinson 1964: 87). Screpanti & Zamagni (2004b: 101) also note that 
the Keynes acceptance that real wage equals the marginal productivity of labour is due to his 
“incomplete” departure from the restrains of the orthodox theory. Nevertheless, as Dedousopoulos 
notes (2004: 209), Keynes was relieved when Hughes and Perlman informed him that their empirical 
research does not support this belief. 
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causality goes as follows: Aggregate demand → product → volume of employment & 
level of wage. 
Secondly, by demolishing the equation of real wages with the money ones, the 
neoclassical argument suggests that full employment can be reached through changes 
on the relative prices of the factors of production lose its value (Screpanti και 
Zamagni 2004b: 101). A cut on the money wage cannot result in full employment. 
Actually, the results of such a cut cannot be predicted. A reduction of money-wages 
will create employment only in one of two cases (Keynes 1936: 165-166): (a) if the 
reduction is relative to money-wages abroad, so exports will rise if the advantages are 
not going to be offset by a change in tariffs, quotas etc., or (b) if the reduction is to be 
so severe, that further changes are expected to be only in the upward direction.12 But 
in this case, the political instability this might create could offset any possible 
advantages. On the other hand, curbing money-wages might have negative effects on 
the volume of employment. As Keynes argues (1936: 165), a reduction of money-
wages will reduce prices somewhat. It will therefore involve some redistribution of 
real income from wage-earners to other factors entering the marginal prime cost 
whose remuneration had not been reduced, and from entrepreneurs to rentiers to 
whom a certain income fixed in terms of money has been guaranteed. In the 
community as a whole, this wage-cut will decrease the propensity to consume since 
this propensity is lower to the richest members of society. So unemployment will rise. 
In one respect, the more equitable the distribution of income is, the smaller the 
intervention will need to be due to the fact that lower income groups are characterised 
by a higher propensity to consume. In this framework, the expansion of the welfare 
state satisfies not only social, but also economic goals. 
Thirdly, state intervention not only does not create distortions, but on the contrary it is 
demanded. Capitalism is not characterised by an inherent tendency towards stability 
and intervention is needed in order for the main goal of economic policy (full 
employment) to be achieved. The latter also means that unemployment is not seen as 
just one more evil but as the main symptom of economic malfunction. 
                                                 
12 If the expectation is for further reduction, this will harm the investment thus produce more 
unemployment 
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Finally, the unemployed are not unemployed by choice and unemployment has only 
marginal relation with wages. Full employment and the rate of unemployment are not 
dependent on the labor market relations, but they are heavily dependent on the 
interdependence of all the basic characteristics of the economy. A wage cut during 
recession will not solve the unemployment problem; in fact, such a policy will 
probably further exacerbate the problem. 
 
Milton Friedman and the “natural rate of unemployment” 
Only surprises matter 
Milton Friedman (1976: 271) 
Three years after the General Theory was published, efforts began to integrate Keynes 
into the neoclassical corpus and make his theory compatible to the neoclassical 
paradigm. The result was the so-called “neoclassical synthesis” (or “neo-
Keynesianism”), which became the core of orthodox analysis after the Second World 
War (Screpanti, Zamagni 2004: 196), dominating economic policy up until the mid-
70’s and the monetarist counter-revolution.13 
An important part of the above mentioned synthesis was the Phillips curve, which 
meant to provide the battleground among neo-Keynesians and monetarists during the 
mid ‘70s (Dedousopoulos 2004: 300). The Phillips curve is based on an empirical 
observation made by Phillips (1958), that there is a negative correlation between the 
rate of unemployment and the rate of inflation. This observation allowed the 
government to tolerate a certain level of inflation in order to achieve lower rates of 
unemployment, or even to evoke inflation in order to reduce unemployment. The 
problems began during the late ‘60s when economists started to observe rising rates 
both of unemployment and inflation (stagflation).   
                                                 
13 It should be noted, that this particular reading of Keynes was not the only one. For example Joan 
Robinson, Piedro Sraffa και Michael Kaletcki, argued that the “neoclassical synthesis” stripped 
Keynes’ theory from its most innovative elements transforming into a mere sub-case of the neoclassical 
theory. Robinson, Sraffa, Kaletcki and others became the founders of another tradition, (post-
Keynesianism) which is characterized by far more radical suggestions. For more on the history of Post 
Keynesian Economics see King 2002 and Harcourt 2006 
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By that time, Friedman and Phelps were arguing that fiscal policy does not influence 
the level of employment due to the fact that in the long-run the Phillips curve is 
vertical (Friedman 1968, Phelps 1968).14 Starting from the neoclassical assumption 
that only real wages matter Friedman claimed that an inflationary pressure would 
have positive results on employment only if the increase in demand (inflation) were to 
be unexpected. However, even in this case the positive outcomes would be temporary. 
The mechanism works something like this: Let us assume that there is an inflation-
demand boost caused by the government. The entrepreneurs will be willing to raise 
nominal wages in order to employ more workers, but this increase will be lower than 
the increase in prices. That is to say nominal wages will go up, but real ones will fall. 
So in the short-run, employment will increase because inflation diminishes real wages 
(which is the typical neoclassical mechanism). During this first stage, workers fail to 
realize the fall of their real wage due to their incomplete knowledge on the general 
level of prices. By contrast, they will conceive the nominal increase in wages as a real 
one.  
However, this situation is only temporary. As time goes by and prices keep rising, 
workers will adjust their wage claims to the real level of inflation. So after some time, 
real wages, employment and unemployment will return to the previous levels, and the 
only change in the newfound balance will be that inflation will be higher (Friedman 
1976: 271-272). The bottom line is that, if the relationship implied by the Phillips 
curve is valid only in the short run, the dilemma is not between higher inflation and 
lower unemployment, but between a fixed rate of unemployment (the “natural” one) 
and lower or higher inflation (Dedousopoulos 2000: 377-378). 
The rate at which unemployment will be once again stabilized is the “natural rate of 
unemployment”. According to Friedman (1968: 10) the natural rate of unemployment 
is by one part frictional unemployment, and by another unemployment arising from 
institutions-practices that inhibit the flexibility of real wages. Friedman claimed 
(1976: 273) that developments like the inclusion of women and young people in the 
labour market in conjunction with the higher mobility of these groups, has increased 
                                                 
14 Forder (2010: 508) has argued that the main points of Friedman’s and Phelps criticism on the Philips 
Curve had been known long before either of them put them forward in their infamous articles. The 
main reason why it dominated was not theoretical at all but was connected to the general historical 
circumstances:  the abandonment of the Keynesian policies was not based solely on theoretical reasons. 
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the time of job-seeking and thus frictional unemployment has also increased; at the 
same time, the welfare state’s expansion has  permitted the unemployed to extend the 
time they expend to search for a job, thus causing a further increase of frictional 
unemployment. Other institutions, like collective agreements on minimum wages, 
union power etc. also hamper wage flexibility. Following the above, the natural rate 
of unemployment is related to the structural characteristics of the labour market and 
can change over time in relation to the changes of those characteristics.15  
Moreover, in contrast to Keynes, Friedman did not consider a high rate of 
unemployment as an indicative measure of economic malfunction or that full 
employment should not be the aim of economic policy. As he characteristically 
writes: “there is a tendency to take it for granted that a high level of recorded 
unemployment is evidence of inefficient use of resources and conversely. This view is 
seriously in error. A low level of unemployment may be a sign of a forced-draft 
economy that is using its resources inefficiently and is inducing workers to sacrifice 
leisure for goods that they value less highly than the leisure under the mistaken belief 
that their real wages will be higher than they prove to be. Or a low natural rate of 
unemployment may reflect institutional arrangements that inhibit change. A highly 
static rigid economy may have a fixed place for everyone whereas a dynamic, highly 
progressive economy, which offers ever-changing opportunities and fosters flexibility, 
may have a high natural rate of unemployment” (Friedman 1976: 273). 
At any rate, Friedman’s influence in Europe (considering employment policy), has 
been limited and selective. Monetarist analysis dominated the area of monetary 
policy, but the policies of enhancing labour market flexibility had been relatively 
limited until the mid-90’s. During the 80’s and early 90’s the main focus was on the 
containment of wages and not so much on enhancing labour market flexibility. This 
made the European Commission conclude that until the mid ‘90s, there was no such 
thing as a common version of labour market deregulation (European Commission 
1993: 314). Essential components of the neoliberal agenda, like the promotion of 
flexibility of the labour market and privatizations, acquired a strong  standing after the 
mid 90s. The “paradox” here is that at the same time, most European countries had 
                                                 
15 There is a footnote to  this.  Friedman maintained that a boost in demand would have no long-term 
effect on employment. However when he was asked to define how much time is needed in order for the 
long-term equilibrium to occur, he gave a number between 10 and 20 years (Friedman 1968: 11). 
[14] 
 
social-democratic parties in government. In order for the new phase of neoliberal 
expansion to take place, a combination of political, economic and theoretical 
developments were to happen: the political and economic development was the 
creation of EMU, the theoretical one was the birth of the NAIRU models. 
 
The NAIRU: Keynesian in the short term and neoclassical in the long term16    
Worldly wisdom teaches that it is better for reputation 
to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally  
John Maynard Keynes (2008 [1936]: 102) 
The main problem with the monetarist approach on labour market was that it actually 
revived the neoclassical analysis without solving any of its main issues or 
contradictions. Moreover, arguing that unemployment of 8%-10% was “natural” or 
frictional sounded unconvincing. The answer came from the NAIRU (Non 
Accelerating Inflation Rate of Unemployment) approaches that emerged in the 
beginning of the 90’s. The main differences of this approach in relation to Friedman’s 
natural rate of unemployment are twofold: on the one hand, the NAIRU does not 
assume full competition; on the other hand, it allows for a notion of involuntary 
unemployment (Stockhammer 2008: 484).17 In this respect, the NAIRU approach is 
definitely more elegant than the neoclassical one (Stockhammer 2004: 14). Eventually 
the NAIRU dominated as a tool of interpreting unemployment as well as an 
employment policy “counselor”. 
Any discussion about NAIRU should take into consideration two facts. Firstly, 
NAIRU does not measure actual/observed unemployment and so it can never be 
observed by itself (Sawyer 1997: 2). What NAIRU does, is pointing to a rate of 
unemployment that will not accelerate inflation. The real/observed rate of 
unemployment may be higher or lower from NAIRU estimations. Secondly, NAIRU 
is the result of a system of mathematic equations with numerous variables whose 
exact number  depends upon the specific model one uses. Consequently, the more 
variables introduced the more relative the importance of each one becomes. This also 
                                                 
16 Stockhammer 2008: 450 
17 See also Layard, Nickell και Jackman 1991: 20-21 
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means that there are numerous NAIRU models depending on the variables used and 
the relation established among these variables.18 
Despite the high mathematical expression of the theory, the governing principle is 
simple: wages are formed through a bargaining process between workers and firms. 
The core element that determines the claims of capital and labour is the expected level 
of inflation. Like in any bargaining process, the equilibrium point is the one where the 
claims of workers match those of capital. In most cases, the wage finally formed is 
higher than the equilibrium one, thus producing unemployment. This unemployment 
is to an extent “structural” in the sense that there are structural characteristics of the 
labour market that affect the bargaining power of each actor (labor and capital). The 
inflation expectation is central. Each factor that raises inflation expectations also 
raises the point of equilibrium. Accordingly, each factor that increases the flexibility 
of wages or prices (in effect lowering inflationary expectations) reduces the point of 
equilibrium. If labour and capital inflation expectations  converge, then inflation 
remains stable. 
According to many NAIRU analyses, the equilibrium that is reached does not 
necessarily clear the market (full employment). On the contrary, the economy will 
always be characterized by a rate of unemployment, which is in effect neoclassical 
(caused by the existence of a real wage higher than the equilibrium one). This rate 
will always be there, even in the case where companies could set the wage level by 
their own (it has been argued that companies are willing to pay higher wages –
efficiency wage– in order to maintain peace in the workplace and enhance the 
productivity of their workforce). 
In regard with the nature of unemployment, Layard, Nickell και Jackman (1991: 41-
44) maintain that it can be simultaneously voluntary and involuntary. The basic idea is 
that labor market is characterized by a duality: there is the primary market where 
wages and terms of employment are better and there is a secondary market where 
wages and terms of employment are worse. Even in the case of high unemployment, 
one could look for work in the secondary market but most of the times one does not.  
                                                 
18 Following a comment by Karamesini (2005: 95-98) the mathematical form of NAIRU is used to give 
a technocratic-objectivity tone to the discussion on unemployment. On the other  hand, its obscurity 
and the various results of the different versions has worked for its benefit instead of against it. 
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In effect, people are voluntarily and involuntarily unemployed at the same time: they 
are willing to work with the existing wage in the primary market but they cannot, and 
at the same time refuse to work in the secondary market where jobs are available. 
Another element of the theory is that the unemployed have a key role in the formation 
of NAIRU. The intensity of their job-search influences the wage claims of the already 
employed; if the unemployed are sufficiently “active” the wage claims of the unions 
will be lower and the level of unemployment lower. So, one way of lowering the 
NAIRU is to address the reasons that make an unemployed person “passive”: 
unemployment benefits should be limited in level and duration, active policies of 
convergence of demand and supply of labour should be enhanced, long-term 
unemployment should be combated, the industrial relations should become more 
flexible, etc (Layard, Nickell και Jackman 1991: 61-74). The bottom line is that the 
vast majority of NAIRU models are characterized by a conservative reservation 
regarding the role of unions due to the fundamental neoclassical view that trade-
unions manage somehow to set the real-wage to a higher level than that of the 
equilibrium one. 
In any case, today there is an open debate about the nature of NAIRU. Some 
economists argue that this thing simply does not exist (Davidson 1998, Karanassou & 
Snower 1997), while others argue that it is not real unemployment that fluctuates 
around NAIRU but the other way around (Stockhammer 2008). If this is true, then 
wage flexibility does not stabilize the system but destabilizes it further and eventually 
NAIRU becomes a political phenomenon and not an economic one (Stockhammer 
2008: 494-501). 
Regarding actual employment policies, NAIRU dominated both on the level of 
political analysis and that of policy suggestions. The most typical example of  its 
dominance is to be found in the European Employment Strategy (EES) that was 
introduced in 1997 and since 2000 was incorporated in the Lisbon Strategy (LS). The 
impressive element here is the comprehensive and integrated way that both the EES 
and the employment dimension of the LS have incorporated policy directives 
stemming from the NAIRU analysis: strengthening professional and geographical 
mobility of the labour force, focusing on “active” policies versus “passive” ones, 
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activate the social protection system in order to encourage job-search, encouragement 
of professional training and education, etc.  
 
Discussion 
The moral problem is a conflict that can never 
be settled. Social life will always present 
mankind with a choice of evils. No metaphysical 
solution that can ever be formulated will seem 
satisfactory for long. The economists were no 
less delusory than those of the theologians that 
they displaced  
Joan Robinson (1964: 137) 
For the larger part of the industrialized world, the years between 1971 and 1983 have 
been marked as a period of great economic and societal transformations. For the 
economists, the crisis of 1973 was a turning point. Even though it did not cause the 
transformation as such, it can be seen as the fuse that sparked the acceleration of 
processes that had already begun since the ‘60s. Jessop (2002) formulates graphically 
what this economic transition meant for the social organization and the general 
economic setting of advanced capitalist economies, when he refers to the move from 
the Keynesian Welfare National State to the Schumpeterian Competition State. In the 
new framework, new polarities have arisen to replace old ones: stability was 
transformed into rigidness in order to be countered by flexibility; equality was to 
become homogenization in order to be countered by diversity, economic justice was 
seen as the opposite of effectiveness (Wagner 2000: 41). The causes of this paradigm 
shift are not solely or even mainly theoretical.  As Hobsbawm (1994: 409) puts it: 
“the battle between Keynesians and neo-liberals was neither a purely technical 
confrontation between professional economists, nor a search for ways of dealing with 
novel and troubling economic problems. It was a war of incompatible ideologies. 
Both sides put forward economic arguments… Yet economics in both cases 
rationalized an ideological commitment, an a priori view of human society”.  
The main concept that runs through this presentation is that the development of 
economic theory had a strong impact on politics, not only through the “immediate” 
policy conclusions it seemed to suggest, but mainly through the political 
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tendencies/correlations that these theories established.  According to this line of 
thought, we can look at economic theories as “regulated ways of practicing the 
possibilities of a discourse” (Foucault 1987 [1969]: 109). Paraphrasing Foucault, it is 
possible to argue that the emergence and adoption of different theoretical paradigms 
on the issue of employment cannot be separated from the “preferences and illusions” 
(Foucault 1987 [1969]: 110) of a social class, but, that these theories cannot be 
viewed as mere ideological mechanisms working towards the establishment of that 
class: ideology does not rule out science (Foucault 1987 [1969]: 208). 
In the theoretical field, the shift of the dominant paradigm has sparked concomitant 
shifts of meaning from the core of the theory to its periphery and vice versa (at this 
point, the approach follows Lakatos (1978) theory on scientific programs). Here, the 
main question concerns the exact place of labour costs within the theoretical 
architecture of each theory. 
The Keynesian revolution was to place the cost of labour at the periphery of the 
theory. In the Keynesian universe, the wage level is the result of causal relationships 
within the economy, not their starting point. The emphasis is to be given  to the 
demand function; the rate of unemployment becomes a measure to evaluate an 
economic system; full employment becomes an end in economic policy and it is 
achieved through macroeconomic policies and not through the labour market itself. In 
such a framework there is no theoretical necessity that predetermines the employment 
contract and so the adjustment of the employment relationship becomes an issue of 
social regulation heavily influenced by social criteria and society’s notion of justice. 
In a society where the vast majority is wage-earners, this necessitates corporatism, 
strong unions and extensive legal protection of employment. Based on Keynesian 
analysis one could argue that social justice and economic development are two sides 
of the same coin, or even better, that social justice is a prerequisite of economic 
development (Ioakeimoglou1998: 124-125, Glyn 1995: 110).19 Keynesian theoretical 
                                                 
19 The above, of course, does not rule out the class character of capitalism. Kaletcki was arguing since 
1943, that “discipline in the factories and political stability are more appreciated than profits by 
business leaders” (Kaletcki 1943: 3). Some years after, Joan Robinson (1969: xi) noted “once the duty 
to maintain full employment is accepted, the whole moral and political basis of the argument changes. 
If we are to be guaranteed full employment in any case, the question to be discussed is what the 
employment should be for… These deep, divisive questions are smoothed over by making employment 
an end in itself. Since Keynes (meaning Keynesian economics) became orthodox, full employment had 
become a conservative slogan”. 
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architecture permitted –to some extent– working class interests to be seen as the 
interests of society as a whole and of the economic system as such; and it also 
legalized state intervention in the economic sphere as having an immediate 
consequence on the “entrance” of policy into economy. 
On the other hand, the monetarist counter-revolution reestablished the cost of labour 
in the core of the theory by putting the emphasis is on the supply side. In this 
framework, the flexibility of wages and labour markets arises as an “objective” 
economic necessity, not just as a political demand of the capital, but as a theoretical 
precondition for prosperity. Monetarist arguments supported the exact opposite views: 
“national interest” was seen as synonymous to low wages and the dismantling of the 
welfare state, and state intervention was reduced to the level of regulation. In the final 
analysis, economic policy remains a policy, meaning that it remains subject to 
struggles, pressures, conflicts and compromises. That is to say, just like there was 
never such a thing as “pure Keynesianism” (in terms of economic policy), there was 
never such a thing as “pure neoliberalism”. The real relation of the two has been one 
of hierarchy (Gravaris 2003: 344). 
So even though the aforementioned shifts on the notion of employment  are strictly 
theoretical, they have had major consequences, due to the fact that they defined the 
way in which the problem of unemployment is to be described, which, conjecturally 
led to the predetermination of its solution (Breslau 1997: 872). These developments, 
even though they did not provide “clean-cut” solutions (due to the policy factor), they 
nevertheless created an intellectual and political tendency towards ways of dealing 
with unemployment. That is to say, that even though labour market deregulation did 
not come about immediately as a consequence of theoretical shifts, developments in 
theory had a definitive role to play. These “regulated means of mobilizing logos” 
(Foucault 1987[1969]: 109), regardless of the fact that they remain to some extent 
open, are in fact circumscribed; they live and are nurtured in a confined political and 
ideological space. The possibilities for different approaches or readings remain 
significant but the space seems to be clearly carved out: “they didn’t say everything 
they could, but they could not say anything”. 
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